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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
 
We are living in a technology intensive world where internet is the most significant source 
of information, a substantial part of communication is carried out electronically and storage 
of data is digitalized. This great shift towards the digital world also means that information, 
having conclusive force and used to be necessarily in physical presence, do not have to be 
physically present anymore. For instance, a letter had to be written on a paper in order to be 
send, but with the state of the art it is possible to send the same letter without the need to 
form it physically.  
 
In the modern age, crimes also have digital dimension. Either they are committed using 
digital equipment or the information relating to crimes are found in electronic format. The 
crimes committed using the means of information and communication technologies; such 
as computers, networks, mobile phones and other electronic mediums, as either tools or 
targets are called cybercrimes. The information relating to any crime, which are either 
stored or transmitted in digital form, on the other hand, are called electronic evidence. 
Thereby, in a law suit or criminal prosecution, evidence are frequently found and collected 
in digital form from the digital communication services and/or the digital storage media. 
Evidence in electronic form serve to same aims with traditional evidence, but they bring 
along some concerns and treats, especially in the course of their collection, such as poten-
tial privacy violations. 
 
With the widespread utilization of electronic information resources and services, it became 
highly important and requisite for the legislatures together with the inter-governmental and 
the international organizations to regulate the issues concerning electronic evidence. Some 
domestic laws provided for specific procedures for the collection of electronic evidence, 
such as Turkish law which will be presented in the following chapters of this research, 
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while the others adapted the existing rules on traditional- mostly physical or paper-based- 
evidence and developed corresponding interpretations, such as the US law.  
 
As to the regulatory efforts at the international level, a general, internationally accepted 
approach may be developed on electronic evidence as a concept; however setting specific 
rules on the procedures relating to the collection of electronic evidence and expecting them 
to be internationally accepted and adopted by all the national laws would not be that sim-
ple. This is because criminal procedural laws “tend to be very specific to each jurisdiction”1 
and are applicable territorially. States pursue different aims and adopt different methods in 
the course of their activities relating to the area of criminal law. The Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime (Cybercrime Convention)
2
, though, is rather one of the most 
successful and comprehensive example of the international regulatory efforts. 
However, both the domestic regulations and the international instruments have one com-
mon problem: procedures relating to the collection of electronic evidence, especially the 
electronic search and seizure and the interception of communication, pose threat against 
individuals’ privacy.  The problem does not arise only due to the nature of the electronic 
evidence, but it grows in relation to the way that the procedures are regulated. The problem 
will be analyzed based on the relevant regulations under Turkish law and Cybercrime Con-
vention.  
Thereby, in order to develop a practice that minimizes the privacy violation risks related to 
the application of criminal procedures, it is particularly important to answer the following 
questions: 
- What are the procedures relating to the collection of electronic evidence under 
Turkish law and Cybercrime Convention? 
- What is the relation between privacy and procedural rules relating to the collec-
tion of electronic evidence in general? 
                                                 
 
1
 Walden, I. Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations (2007), p.353 
2
 Further information will be provided in the following chapters. 
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- What are the privacy concerns that come along with the regulations on search 
and seizure of computers in the Turkish legal system? 
- What are the privacy concerns that come along with the regulations on intercep-
tion of communication in the Turkish legal system?  
- What are the privacy criticisms brought against the Cybercrime Convention? 
- What are the recommendations proposed to enhance the protection of privacy? 
 
This research aims to provide some guidance for answering the above questions with a 
brief review on what is electronic evidence, the differences between traditional and elec-
tronic evidence, the types of electronic evidence. 
 
1.2 Subject and Structure of the Thesis 
 
This paper will provide general information on electronic evidence, but the main focus is 
the privacy concerns that arise in relation to the procedures on the collection of electronic 
evidence, especially electronic search and seizure and interception of communication. 
Structure of the paper is as follows: 
Chapter 2 covers what electronic evidence is, differences between traditional evidence and 
electronic evidence, types of electronic evidence and procedures relating to the collection 
of electronic evidence under Turkish law and Cybercrime Convention. 
Chapter 3 will present the following issues: general principles on and limitations to the 
right to privacy regulated in the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey (TC), privacy concerns in relation to the regulations on electronic search and sei-
zure and interception of communication procedures under various Turkish legislation and 
lastly, the criticisms brought against the Cybercrime Convention concerning privacy mat-
ters and the proposed recommendations. 
And at last Chapter 4 will sum up all the information provided and the arguments devel-
oped throughout the paper.  
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1.3 Methodology  
 
This thesis has two primary focus, first one is how the electronic evidence are regulated in 
the Turkish legal system and the Cybercrime Convention and the second one is what are 
the threats against privacy in relation to the criminal procedures regulated under Turkish 
legislation and the Cybercrime Convention.  
The main reason behind the selection of Turkish law and Cybercrime Convention is: the 
Convention has to be put into force in Turkey
3
 which means a parallel regulation to the 
Convention has to be provided in the Turkish legal system. Nevertheless, the existing state 
of the regulations differ, therefore each subject covered in this paper are presented within 
the context and sole of the relevant legislation. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that this 
is not a comparative study of Turkish law and Cybercrime Convention.  
This research is, in general, a conceptual framework. Regarding the regulations on elec-
tronic evidence, though, two elements stand out: descriptive method and exploratory meth-
od. Various concepts, within the context, are described, and in order to gain familiarity 
with the phenomenon and acquire new insight, explanations on the regulations under Turk-
ish legal system and Cybercrime Convention are provided.  
As regards to the abovementioned second subject, whereas, analysis has been made about 
the regulations on the right to privacy, the electronic search and seizure and the interception 
of communication, relevant approaches on these subjects are identified, and associated cri-
tiques about the regulations in the Turkish law and Cybercrime Convention are asserted.  
Additionally, relevant examples from case-law are presented in order to shed light on the 
problems arising from the implementation and the application of electronic search and sei-
zure and interception of communication. Also, steady interpretations concerning the appli-
cations of those procedures and the privacy violations can be established in the light of 
those suitable precedents. Regrettably, Turkish case-law lacks relevant precedents on the 
subject; therefore, it has been referred to cases from other legal systems. Great majority of 
                                                 
 
3
 Turkey has signed the Cybercrime Convention on November 10, 2010 but it has not been ratified yet- please 
see http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG 
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the cases are from the US case-law, due to the fact that it is very well-developed concern-
ing the electronic evidence, and also the Fourth Amendment is concerned with the protec-
tion of privacy in a similar fashion as Article 8 of the EHRC and Article 13 of the TC
4
.  
The provisions of the TC and the TCPC, referred throughout the study, are from the official 
translations of the texts. However, other referred legislation do not have official transla-
tions, therefore no citation has been made from the provisions of those instruments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Further explanation will be provided under Chapter 3. 
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2 ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
 
2.1 What is Electronic Evidence? 
 
Electronic evidence is any probative information stored or transmitted in digital form
5
. 
Such information can be stored in computer hard drive, optical disks, floppy disks, remote 
internet storage, handheld devices, memory cards, network servers, emails etc.
6
.  
 
Formal rules relating to the admissibility of evidence vary among different jurisdictions, 
though, Turkish courts consider six issues during their assessment: electronic evidence, like 
any other evidence, must be: 
• admissible, 
• authentic, 
• accurate, 
• complete, 
• convincing to courts, 
• in compliance with provisions on ‘evidence obtained by illegal or unfair means’ 
(especially provisions related to search, copy and seizure)
7
 
Digitally stored or transmitted information with a probative value, which is also admissible, 
authentic, accurate, complete, convincing to courts and in compliance with the procedural 
rules, can be used at trial
8
 as electronic evidence. Nevertheless, before the trial, specifically 
during the investigation, ensuring that the collected information meet the above require-
ments is of primary importance. 
 
                                                 
 
5
 Pollitt, M. M., Report on Digital Evidence (2001), p. D4-89  
6
 Lange, M.C.S. and Nimsger, K.M., Electronic Evidence and Discovery: What Every Lawyer Should Know 
Now (2009), p. 72 
7
 Article 38(6) of the TC and article 134 of the TCPC, Karagülmez, A. Bilişim Suçları ve Soruşturma- 
Kovuşturma Evreleri (2011), p. 395&395 
8
Casey, E. Digital Evidence and Computer Crime (2000), p. 48&49 
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2.2 Differences between Traditional Evidence and Electronic Evidence 
 
Peter Sommer outlined the following differences between traditional and electronic evi-
dence in his article titled “Digital Evidence: Emerging Problems in Forensic Computing”: 
 In principle, it is hard to change the structure of traditional/physical evidence; 
whereas electronic data may change within a computer and/or a transmission line at 
any moment.  
 When physical evidence is altered it would most probably leave traces or at least 
the alteration would be perceptible; however electronic evidence can be easily al-
tered without leaving any trace. 
 It may be much easier to change or distort the electronic evidence than the physical 
evidence during the collection process.  
 Traditional evidence can be perceived at first sight; whereas most of the immediate 
electronic evidence cannot be read by humans, “many exhibits are print-out derived 
from primary electronic material”. 
 Electronic data can be obtained to the amount electronic devices record them. 
 The velocity of technology has a profound effect on the quality of electronic evi-
dence and the possibility of obtaining them
9
. 
  
In the article it is also stated that electronic evidence increase some of the treats which al-
ready exist regarding the traditional evidence; such as more commercial transactions are 
recorded, it is much easier to trace a person’s history and activities or it becomes possible 
to carry out computer-assisted investigation methods
10
 which leads to perform legal as-
sessments, such as this paper.  
 
 
                                                 
 
9
 This comparison has been adopted in the Turkish doctrine as well. e.g. Karagülmez, A. Bilişim Suçları ve 
Soruşturma- Kovuşturma Evreleri (2011), p. 394  
10
 For the differences of physical and electronic evidence also see. Casey, E. Digital Evidence and Computer 
Crime (2000), p. 4&5 
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2.3 Types of Electronic Evidence 
 
An electronic document or information consists of various data, sometimes comprising 
more than one quality; for instance, electronic mails consist: data that conveys the meaning 
or substance of a communication and data indicating the communication’s origin, destina-
tion, route, time, date and size. Due to this reason, each piece of legislation adopts or cre-
ates a corresponding classification for electronic evidence with respect to its type
11
. In or-
der to apprehend the procedures relating to the collection of electronic evidence explained 
in the following chapters, it is useful to take a look at the varying categorizations adopted 
in the Turkish legal system and the Cybercrime Convention. 
 
2.3.1 In Turkish Legal System 
 
There have been various classifications of evidence made in the Turkish doctrine. Within 
the scope of this research, two of those are relevant: with regards to evidential value and 
with regards to the content of evidence.  
 
With regards to evidential value, evidence can be classified as: primary evidence, which do 
not require corroboration and are direct, and secondary evidence that need to be corrobo-
rated and are indirect
12
. Ersan Şen, who is a criminal law professor and a lawyer, makes a 
further subdivision among the secondary evidence as physical evidence and artificial evi-
dence. Physical evidence are traces occurred during the crime or by the tools used in the 
crime, such as knife wound or forged money. These can also belong to the concerned per-
son, for instance finger print, blood and strand of the suspect or victim. Whereas, artificial 
evidence are traces that do not reveal naturally but formed by people, like the special cloth-
ing worn or accessories used during the crime or records attained through interception of 
                                                 
 
11
 For example; Article 2 of the Directive 2002/58/EC, Article 1 of the Cybercrime Convention  
12
Dinler, V., Ceza Muhakemesinde Delillerin Toplanması (2009), p.8&9 
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communication
13
. With regards to the evidential value, the electronic evidence may classify 
as secondary and artificial evidence.  
 
With regards to the content of the evidence, there are testimonial evidence, documentary 
evidence and real evidence/indications
14
. Testimonial evidence are submissions of the sus-
pect or the accused or victim(s) and witness statements. Documentary evidence are written 
records, sound and imagery recordings. And all the rest are considered as real evidence or 
indications which require corroboration
15
. Electronic evidence may fall under documentary 
evidence or real evidence, but not testimonial evidence due to the fact that the testimony 
has to be given in front of the court or law enforcement officers in order it to qualify as 
testimonial evidence.  
 
Nevertheless, none of the Turkish legislation specifically mentions electronic evidence and 
makes a distinction based on the types of the electronic evidence, such as content data, traf-
fic data or communications data. It is only possible to infer electronic evidence based on 
the mean used to obtain it. 
 
2.3.2 In Cybercrime Convention 
 
The Convention refers to the term ‘computer data’ which basically stands for ‘electronic 
evidence’. ‘Computer data’ means data in electronic form or data that can be directly pro-
cessed by computer system
16
, including content, traffic and subscriber data
17
. Three differ-
ent types of electronic evidence, in particular, referred in the Convention are ‘content data’, 
‘traffic data’ and ‘subscriber data’. 
                                                 
 
13
 Şen, E., Ceza Yargılaması Süreci (2011), p.286 
14
 Dennis, I. H., The Law of Evidence (1999), p. 369 et seq. and also Kunter, N. and Yenisey, F., Muhakeme 
Hukuku Dalı Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku (2002), p. 564 et seq. 
15
 Dinler, V., Ceza Muhakemesinde Delillerin Toplanması (2009), p.9 
16
 The Explanatory Report, ¶25 
17
 supra note, ¶28 and 136 
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Content Data 
 
The Convention does not provide for definition of ‘content data’, but in paragraph 209 of 
the Explanatory Report it is stated that ‘content data’ “refers to the communication content 
of the communication; i.e., the meaning or purport of the communication, or the message 
or information being conveyed by the communication (other than traffic data)”18.  
 
Traffic Data 
 
According to Article 1(d) of the Cybercrime Convention, ‘traffic data’ means: 
“… any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, 
generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, 
indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, 
or type of underlying service” 
 
Subscriber Data/ Information 
 
According to Article 18(3) of the Cybercrime Convention, ‘subscriber information’ means: 
“…any information contained in the form of computer data or any other form that 
is held by a service provider, relating to subscribers of its services other than traffic 
or content data and by which can be established: 
                                                 
 
18
 An example definition of content data can be found in the ‘Model Policy Guidelines & Legislative Texts’18 
prepared under the HIPCAR project, which is: “content data means any data whether in digital, optical, or 
other form, including metadata, that conveys essence, substance, information, meaning, purpose, intent, or 
intelligence, either singularly or when in a combined form, in either its unprocessed or processed form. Con-
tent data includes any data that conveys the meaning or substance of a communication as well as data pro-
cessed, stored, or transmitted by computer programs”. Available at: 
http://hipcar.gov.kn/sites/hipcar.gov.kn/files/HIPCAR_1-2-
B_Model_Policy_Guidelines_and_Legislative_Texts_Electronic_Evidence.pdf 
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a the type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and 
the period of service; 
b the subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other ac-
cess number, billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service 
agreement or arrangement; 
c any other information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, 
available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement. 
Different from ‘content’ and ‘traffic’ data, the subscriber data includes forms of data other 
than computer data, meaning that it does not, exclusively, have to be in electronic form. 
 
2.4 Procedures Relating to the Collection of Electronic Evidence 
   
2.4.1 Turkish Law 
 
This subchapter will be presenting general information on Criminal Procedure Law in Tur-
key, followed by related provisions on the collection of electronic evidence.  
The main aim of a criminal proceeding is to ensure fact-finding and secure a fair trial in the 
sense of Article 6 of the ECHR
19
. Criminal proceedings have two phases: investigation and 
prosecution. Investigation is “the phase that comprises transactions, starting with gaining 
knowledge of suspicion of a committed crime by competent authorities…, and continuing 
until the indictment has been approved”20. And prosecution is “the phase beginning with 
the decision on the admissibility of the indictment and ending with the final judgment”21.  
 
                                                 
 
19
 Article 160(2) of the TCPC 
20
 Article 2(e) of the TCPC 
21
 Article 2(f) of the TCPC 
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In order to ensure fact-finding and secure a fair trial, collection of evidence takes place 
during the investigation
22
. Public prosecutor is obliged, through the law enforcement offic-
ers, who are under his command, to collect and secure evidence
23
. “In cases where, at the 
end of the investigation phase, collected evidence constitute sufficient suspicion that a 
crime has been committed, then the public prosecutor”24 prepares an indictment. Apparent-
ly, collection of evidence is a transaction related to the investigation which, as a rule, shall 
be kept secret
25
 and entered the case records
26. “The execution of the interactions related to 
the investigation shall be achieved according to the orders and directions of the public 
prosecutor”27; however, some of the interactions related to the investigation, such as ‘inter-
ception of correspondence through telecommunication’28 or ‘search of computers, comput-
er programs and transcripts, copying and provisional seizure’29, require a judge approval or 
decision. This is, mostly, because such interactions are considered to be coercive 
measures
30
 which serve to the investigation of the factual truth and conclusion of a fair 
judgment and trial, but yet bring limitations on Constitutional rights and freedoms of peo-
ple of interest
31
. Under the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure (TCPC), procedures of 
electronic evidence collection are regulated as coercive measures.  
 
Although TCPC does not provide for a definition of electronic evidence, procedures related 
to the collection of electronic evidence are as follows: 
 
                                                 
 
22
 Article 160(2) of the TCPC 
23
 Article 160(2) of the TCPC 
24
 Article 170(2) of the TCPC 
25
 Article 157(1) of the TCPC is contrary to the rule on the main hearing which is open to the public (Article 
182(1) of the TCPC). An example of the secrecy of the investigation is the Article 135(5) of the TPCP which 
states that interception of communication “decisions rendered and interactions conducted according to the 
provisions of this article shall be kept confidential while the measure is pending”. 
26
 Article 169(2) of the TCPC 
27
 Article 164(2) of the TCPC 
28
 Article 135 of the TCPC 
29
 Article 134 of the TCPC 
30
 See. The title of the TCPC, First Book, Part Four, in the original text, is ‘coercive measures’.  
31Aydıner, Ö.F., Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve İç Hukukumuzda Koruma Tedbirleri Olarak Tutuklama 
(2007), p.21 et seq. 
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 Search of computers, computer programs and transcripts, copying and provisional 
seizure (Article 134) 
 
Computers, computer programs and records used by the suspect can be searched, cop-
ied and analyzed only if there is a judge decision. This measure can be taken only if it is 
not possible to obtain evidence by any other mean, in other words, it is applicable as a 
last resort. Second paragraph of the provision allows for provisional seizure of the 
computer and equipment, if it is deemed to be necessary for the retrieval and copying of 
information which are inaccessible- as the passwords are undecipherable- or unreacha-
ble- as they are hidden. In case of seizure, a back-up of all the data in the system shall 
be made. It is also permissible, without seizing the computer or computer records, to 
copy the data entirely or partially. Copied data shall be printed on paper and this situa-
tion shall be recorded and signed by those who are concerned.   
 
 Locating, listening and recording of correspondence (Article 135) 
 
Listening and recording of correspondence and assessment of information related to 
signals are exclusively applicable to crimes listed under paragraph 6 of the article 
which are deemed serious
32
. If, during the investigation of a crime that falls within the 
catalogue, there exist strong grounds of suspicion indicating that the crime has been 
committed and there is no other possibility to obtain evidence, suspect’s correspond-
ence can be located, listened or recorded and information related to signals can be as-
sessed with a decision given by judge or, in case delay is prejudicial, by public prosecu-
tor. However, suspect’s correspondence with people who enjoy the privilege of refrain-
ing from testimony as a witness
33
 shall not be recorded. In such cases, in which this sit-
uation has appeared after the recording was conducted, the recordings shall be de-
stroyed immediately. The decision of locating, listening and recording of correspond-
                                                 
 
32
 These are mostly crimes against human rights, national security or territorial integrity.  
33
 See. Article 45 of the TCPC 
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ence and assessment of information related to signals “shall include the nature of the 
charged crime, the identity of the individual, upon whom the measure is going to be ap-
plied, the nature of the tool of communication, the number of the telephone, or the code 
that makes it possible to identify the connection of the communication, the nature of the 
measure, its extent and duration”34. Duration of the measure shall be maximum 3 
months, but may be extended once in individual crimes and numerous times in orga-
nized crimes
35
. Decisions rendered and interactions conducted according to the provi-
sion shall be kept confidential while the measure is pending
36
. 
 
 Enforcement of decisions, destroying the contents of the communication (Article 
137) 
 
Article 135 of the TCPC sets the principles for interception of communications, where-
as Article 137 regulates the application of the interception. The decision rendered ac-
cording to Article 135 shall be immediately enforced, including the implantation of the 
relevant devices, by the service provider officers, in cases where it is requested in writ-
ing (this would be the ‘production order’ in the sense of Cybercrime Convention) by 
the public prosecutor or by the law enforcement officers who has been empowered by 
the public prosecutor
37. “The recordings that are produced according to Article 135 
shall be decoded and transcribed into written form by individuals who are appointed by 
the public prosecutor”38. In cases where it is decided that there is ‘no ground for prose-
cution’39 or where judge does not approve the interception decision given by the public 
prosecutor
40
 during the execution of the measure provided under Article 135, the execu-
tion of the measure shall be terminated immediately and recordings related to the locat-
                                                 
 
34
 Article 135(3) of the TCPC 
35
 Article 135(3) of the TCPC 
36
 Article 135(5) of the TCPC 
37
 Article 137(1) of the TCPC 
38
 Article 137(2) of the TCPC 
39
 Article 172(1) of  the TCPC 
40
 Article 135(1) of the TCPC 
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ing and listening of correspondence shall be destroyed within 10 days
41
. After the re-
cordings are destroyed, the person of interest shall be informed in writing about the rea-
sons, context, duration and outcomes of the measure
42
. 
 
 Coincidental evidence (Article 138) 
 
Coincidental evidence is the evidence which is not connected to an ongoing investiga-
tion or prosecution but happens to be revealed in the course of a search or seizure or in-
terception of communication carried out in connection to that particular investigation or 
prosecution. First paragraph of the provision enables the use of coincidental evidence 
obtained during a search or seizure in another criminal procedure. If such evidence 
generates reasonable grounds of suspicion that another criminal offense has been com-
mitted, it is shall be immediately secured and the public prosecutor shall be informed 
thereof. Whereas, the second paragraph prohibits the use of coincidental evidence ob-
tained during the performance of interception of communication in the investigation or 
prosecution of a crime which does not fall under Article 135(6) of the TCPC. In other 
words, the evidence must raise suspicion of a crime that is listed in Article 135(6) has 
been committed, so that it may be secured and the public prosecutor may be informed 
thereof. 
 
 Surveillance with technical means (Article 140) 
 
Business premises of a suspect, as well as his activities conducted in public areas, may 
be subject to surveillance with technical means, including voice and imagery record-
ings, provided that, there is no other possibility of obtaining evidence, there exist strong 
grounds of suspicion indicating that the crime has been committed and the crime being 
investigated falls under the list provided in the same provision. The decision on surveil-
                                                 
 
41
 Article 137(3) of the TCPC 
42
 Article 137(4) of the TCPC 
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lance shall be given by judge or, in case delay is prejudicial, by public prosecutor
43
, for 
up to 4 weeks which may be extended once, if necessary
44
. Surveillance of residence is 
prohibited
45
. Also the evidence obtained according to this provision cannot be used in 
the investigation and prosecution of a crime other than those listed in the article
46
. 
 
In addition to the regulations under TCPC, there are some other laws and regulations con-
cerning the applications of aforementioned measures providing definitions for the terms 
used and details about the principles to be followed during their applications which will be 
covered when relevant. 
 
 2.4.2 Cybercrime Convention  
 
The Convention intents to provide a legal basis for the harmonization of domestic criminal 
substantive law in the area of cybercrime and the domestic criminal procedural law for 
more effective criminal investigations and proceedings
47
. Chapter II of the Convention reg-
ulates “measures to be taken at the national level” and Section 1 provides provisions con-
cerning substantive criminal law. Section 2 on procedural law issues, whereas, is subject to 
analysis.  
According to Article 14(1), each party shall adopt legislative and other measures necessary 
to establish the powers and procedures for the purpose of specific criminal investigations or 
proceedings which are applicable to “the collection of evidence in electronic form of a 
criminal offence”48. Establishment, implementation and application of the powers and pro-
cedures “which shall incorporate the principle of proportionality”49 are subject to condi-
                                                 
 
43
 Article 140(2) of the TCPC 
44
 Article 140(3) of the TCPC 
45
 Article 140(5) of the TCPC 
46
 Article 140(4) of the TCPC 
47
 The Explanatory Report, ¶16 
48
 Article 14(1)(c) of the Cybercrime Convention 
49
 Article 15(1) of the Cybercrime Convention 
 17 
tions and safeguards provided for the protection of human rights and liberties
50
. Apart from 
these common provisions, the Convention provides the following provisions regarding the 
electronic evidence and related collection procedures: 
 Expedited preservation of stored computer data (Article 16) 
‘Data preservation’ means keeping data, which is already stored, secure and safe. In 
other words, protecting the already stored data “from anything that would cause its cur-
rent quality or condition to change or deteriorate”51. This provision aims to secure the 
data from being lost and/or intentionally manipulated or deleted by ensuring that the 
Parties adopt necessary provisional measures to oblige the custodian or other person 
who is to preserve the computer data, such as businesses or service providers, to main-
tain the data integrity by means of preservation order for data and/or communications, 
including the traffic data. Howsoever the data cannot be preserved for a period longer 
than 90 days, unless a subsequent renewal of the order is provided
52
. In addition to the 
time limit set out in paragraph 2, Parties are required to introduce confidentiality 
measures in order to “protect the privacy of the data subject or other persons who may 
be mentioned or identified in that data”53.   
 Expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data (Article 17) 
“Obtaining stored ‘traffic data’ that is associated with past communications may be 
critical in determining the source or destination of a past communication, which is cru-
cial to identifying”54 the perpetrator(s). Even though the provision does not specify the 
means to preserve traffic data expeditiously, separate preservation order on each service 
provider can be issued or a single order that would apply to all identified service pro-
                                                 
 
50
 Article 15 of the Cybercrime Convention is relatively important as for the provision of adequate level of 
protection of right to privacy, regulated under Article 8 of the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which will be analyzed in Chapter 3. 
51
 The Explanatory Report, ¶151 
52
 supra note, ¶155 and 156 
53
 supra note, ¶163 
54
 supra note, ¶166 
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viders involved in a specific communication transmission can be served sequentially
55
. 
Clearly specifying the type of traffic data in the order is crucial in order to obtain a suf-
ficient amount of traffic data that would serve to trace the origin and destination of the 
communication and to identify the perpetrator
56
. 
 Production order (Article 18) 
Production order is a less coercive measure compared to, for instance, search and sei-
zure of computer data, in which a person or service provider is compelled to provide or 
submit stored or existing computer data or subscriber information in that person’s or 
service provider’s possession or control. By means of production order, telephone 
number or e-mail address associated with a particular subscriber name or subscriber’s 
name or address associated with a particular telephone number or e-mail address can be 
requested
57
. Although the provision does not specifically refer to confidentiality, confi-
dentiality is essential as “production order can sometimes be employed as a preliminary 
measure in the investigation, preceding further measures such as search and seizure or 
real-time interception of other data”58. 
 Search and seizure of stored computer data (Article 19) 
Search of electronic evidence is similar to the search of traditional evidence in two 
ways: “gathering of the data occurs during the period of the search and in respect of da-
ta that exists at that time”59 and “the precondition for obtaining legal authority to under-
take a search is the existence of grounds to believe,… that such data exists in a particu-
lar location and will afford evidence of a specific criminal offence”60. However, as the 
computer data is in intangible form and can only be read by certain equipment, the data 
itself cannot be seized like the traditional evidence. Instead the physical medium, where 
the data is stored, can be seized. Or a tangible copy of the data, such as print-out, or 
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copy of the data on a physical medium, such as USB, can be made and then the tangible 
or physical copy can be seized. A further difficulty in search and seizure of computer 
data is that the data may not be stored in the particular computer that is searched rather 
the data can be accessible through an associated data storage device or communication 
system, like the Internet
61
. Therefore paragraph 2 provides for extension of search and 
similar access to another computer system or part of it where there is ground to believe 
that the data required is stored in that other computer system, but only if the other sys-
tem or part is in the territory of the authority carrying out the search
62
. The provision of 
information must be reasonable according to paragraph 4 which “may include disclos-
ing a password or other security measure to the investigating authorities”63. Neverthe-
less if disclosure of a password or other security measure threatens the privacy of third 
parties or other data, then only the necessary information shall be disclosed
64
. By the 
way, the provision does not touch upon the issue of notification of interested parties
65
. 
 Real-time collection of traffic data (Article 20) 
Real-time collection of traffic data “can correlate the time, date and source and destina-
tion of the suspect’s communications with the time of the intrusions into the systems of 
victims, identify other victims or show links with associates”66. Traffic data can be col-
lected only if associated communications are specified
67
. It is also important to carry 
out the collection without the knowledge of the investigated party
68
. Intrusiveness of 
collection of ‘traffic data’ in comparison to collection of ‘content data’ is controver-
sial
69, but it is considered that the ‘traffic data’ is necessary “to trace the source of a 
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communication as a starting point for collecting further evidence or as part of the evi-
dence of the offence”70. 
 Interception of content data71 (Article 21) 
“Traditionally, the collection of content data in respect of telecommunications (e.g., tel-
ephone conversations) has been a useful investigative tool to determine that the com-
munication is of an illegal nature”72. The real-time interception of telecommunications 
is relatively important, as well as the past telecommunications, in order to reveal com-
pleted crimes and to prevent the occurrence of crimes that are in the process
73
. This ar-
ticle is an exact parallel of Article 20, so the above explanations apply equally to the in-
terception of content data
74, in fact “the conditions and safeguards applicable to real-
time interception of content data may be more stringent than those applicable to the re-
al-time collection of traffic data”75. “As interception of content data is a very intrusive 
measure on private life”76. 
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3 PRIVACY CONCERNS RELATING TO THE COLLECTION OF ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE 
 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms may become controversial when it comes to evi-
dence retrieval. As a matter of fact, coercive measures, which are used as means of gather-
ing evidence, are closely related to human rights and fundamental freedoms
77
. This is be-
cause coercive measures, such as arrest, custody, search and seizure, bring restrictions on 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the suspects and even, in some cases, of the third 
parties. It is accepted that human rights and fundamental freedoms can be restricted in cer-
tain circumstances
78
 provided that; for instances, it is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or for the prevention of disorder or crime. 
According to Article 13 of the TC; 
 
“Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity 
with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without in-
fringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be in conflict with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic order of the 
society and the secular Republic and the principle of proportionality”. 
 
Primarily, the right in question shall be determined in order to set the limitations on the use 
of restriction of rights. Thereby, in terms of procedures for the collection of electronic evi-
dence, especially for search and seizure of computer data and interception of communica-
tions, the right to respect for private and family life, in particular, is the one being endan-
gered to a greater extent.  
 
The regulations on right to privacy in the ECHR and TC are parallel. According to Article 
8(1) of the ECHR and Article 20(1) of the TC, everyone has the right to respect for his pri-
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vate and family life. However, the respect for correspondence falls under the right to priva-
cy in the ECHR; whereas, it is granted in Article 22 of the TC, under the title of “Freedom 
of Communication”. That is to say, the Article 20 of TC is regulated in a way that it is re-
lated to the search and seizure and the Article 22 of TC is rather related to the interception 
of communication
79
.  
 
According to the second paragraph of Article 8 of the ECHR, “…in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others”, there can be interference with the exercise of right to privacy. As it is mentioned 
previously
80
, signatories of the Cybercrime Convention have to ensure conditions and safe-
guards which provide for adequate protection of human rights, in this context such as the 
right to privacy. Apparently, the main reasoning behind the imposition of the procedures 
regulated under Chapter II of the Cybercrime Convention is that the applications of the 
procedures are necessary for the prevention of crime. However, as it will be supported by 
some court decisions presented in the following chapters, the application of the procedures 
shall also comply with the necessities of a democratic society and the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of other individuals.  
 
Moreover, the sole purpose of prevention of crime should not be considered sufficient to 
interfere with individuals’ right to privacy as it may cause an erroneous assumption like as 
long as the aim of the application of a coercive measure is to prevent crimes, the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can be put at stake. In some cases, this erroneous assump-
tion results in exercise of excessive force or discretion by the law enforcement officers. In 
order to strike a balance between the interest in effective law enforcement and intrusion on 
the right to privacy, applications of the procedures shall pursue the interests of a democratic 
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society and principle of proportionality. In other words, the coercive measure must be nec-
essary in and proportionate with the concrete case.    
 
Within this context, the analysis on the privacy violations either of the suspect’s or the third 
parties’ is a delicate subject which shall be analyzed separately in relation to the regulations 
on search and seizure of computers and interception of communication under Turkish law. 
First part of this chapter, will present the issue in relation to Turkish legislation, and the 
explanations will be supported by the legislations of other states and examples from various 
states’ case-law, especially due to the fact that Turkish case law on the subject is relatively 
poor. And in the second part, privacy concerns related to the regulations in the Cybercrime 
Convention will be presented covering both the electronic search and seizure and the inter-
ception of communications.  
 
3.1 In Turkish Legal System  
 
3.1.1 Search and Seizure of Computers 
 
“Generally, a warrant is required to search and seize evidence… To obtain warrant, inves-
tigators must demonstrate probable cause and detail the place to be searched and the per-
sons or things to be seized. More specifically, investigators have to convince a judge [in the 
civil-law] or magistrate [in the common-law] that, in all probability: a crime has been 
committed, evidence of crime is in existence, and the evidence is likely to exist at the place 
to be searched”81.  
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There have been several cases brought before the US Courts on the grounds of unreasona-
ble and/or unlawful search and seizure
82
. Katz v. United States
83
 Case is one of the most 
widely known decision which provides explanations on the interpretations of the unreason-
able search and seizure and discussions on the nature of the right to privacy and the legal 
definition of a search. Although, the Katz decision is on traditional search and seizure, pro-
visions and interpretations relating to the traditional search and seizure are also applicable 
to the electronic searches. However, in the Turkish legislation there are different provisions 
for traditional and electronic search and seizure.  
 
When the Turkish case-law is considered, one can see that electronic search has never been 
challenged on the grounds of violation of right to privacy, instead two issues were ad-
dressed: what are the proper conditions for collecting evidence and what techniques shall 
be used
84
. However the legal problems (not technical) are the main focus of the paper and 
this section. There are two groups of legal problem relating to the search and seizure of 
computers associated with privacy: problems arising from legislation and problems that 
occur during the application. 
  
i) Problems arising from legislation 
  
Article 20(2) of the TC is related to search and seizure; however search and seizure of the 
computers is not explicitly mentioned in the provision: 
“Unless there exists a decision duly given by a judge on one or several of the 
grounds of national security, public order, prevention of crime commitment, protec-
tion of  public health and public morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of 
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others, or unless there exists a written order of an agency authorized by law in cases 
where delay is prejudicial, again on the above-mentioned grounds, neither the per-
son nor the private papers, nor belongings, of an individual shall be searched nor 
shall they be seized…” 
Absence of an explicit reference to computers seems like an omission which raises the 
question whether computers can be considered as ‘belongings’ or ‘private papers’. Howev-
er, this absence should not imply that the search and seizure of computers are excluded 
from the application of this provision; because if the provision is interpreted as it does not 
include computers, then it would not be possible to claim violation of right to privacy with 
respect to computer search and seizure. 
Computer, which is to be searched or seized, may not be a ‘belonging’ in the sense of arti-
cle 20(2); for instance, it may belong to a third party but may be in the physical possession 
of the suspect. Similarly, the copies made at a computer search, which comprise large 
amounts of (personal) data, may not be interpreted as ‘private papers’ in the traditional 
sense. Therefore either the provision shall be amended in a way that allows computers to 
fall under the scope of the article or a steady interpretation in line with the above explana-
tions shall be developed by the judiciary.  
Furthermore, Article 20(2) of the TC shall be equally applicable, as if the private papers or 
belongings were being searched or seized, to the cases where it is claimed that during the 
exercise of a search or seizure of computer the right to privacy is violated. By equal appli-
cation, it is meant that for the computer search and seizure there shall also be a decision 
given on the grounds of national security and public order, for prevention of crime, protec-
tion of public health and public morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
However, it is important to emphasize that the latest amendments to the Constitution were 
in 2004, whereas computer search and seizure found its legal basis in 2005 under the 
TCPC, meaning that after the provision of computer search and seizure, legislatures have 
not amended the Constitution concordantly; therefore, until such amendment is made inter-
 26 
pretation of the Article 20(2) of TC shall allow for taking the developments in the society 
into account.      
 
Even though the Article 20(2) of TC does not explicitly refer to computers, there are pro-
cedural rules relating to the search and seizure of computers under different legislations. 
The main regulation on computer search and seizure is the Article 134 of TCPC, which is 
as follows: 
 
“(1) Upon the motion of the public prosecutor during an investigation with respect 
to a crime, the judge shall issue a decision on the search of computers and computer 
programs and records
85
 used by the suspect, the copying, analyzing, and 
textualization of those records, if it is not possible to obtain the evidence by other 
means. 
(2) If computers, computer programs and computer records are inaccessible, as the 
passwords are not known, or if the hidden information is unreachable, then the 
computer and equipment that are deemed necessary may be provisionally seized in 
order to retrieve and to make the necessary copies. Seized devices shall be returned 
without delay in cases where the password has been solved and the necessary copies 
are produced. 
(3) While enforcing the seizure of computers or computer records, all data included 
in the system shall be copied. 
(4) In cases where the suspect or his representative makes a request, a copy of this 
copied data shall be produced and given to him or to his representative and this ex-
change shall be recorded and signed. 
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(5) It is also permissible to produce a copy of the entire data or some of the data in-
cluded in the system, without seizing the computer or the computer records. Copied 
data shall be printed on paper and this situation shall be recorded and signed by the 
related persons”. 
 
The provision does not make any reference to probable cause; whereas the general provi-
sion on search and seizure specifically states that a physical search on the suspect or search 
on his belongings, residence, business or other premises can be conducted only if there is 
probable cause that the evidence may be obtained by such conduct
86
. Imposing a probable 
cause requirement for the physical search but not for the electronic search seems to be in-
appropriate. 
 
Besides, both the traditional and the electronic search are regulated under Part II of the 
Regulation on Judicial and Preventive Search
87
 with the title of ‘Judicial Search’. Articles 
5-16 all refer to judicial search; whereas Article 17 regulates specifically electronic search, 
oddly, without making any reference to previous provisions on the judicial search.  
 
Additionally, Article 5 provides the definition of judicial search which does not mention 
computers or other electronic devices at all, same as Article 20(2) of the TC. This defini-
tion is particularly important due to the fact that, according to Article 5 of the Regulation 
probable cause
88
 is a precondition only for judicial search, but neither for electronic nor for 
preventive search there is such precondition.  
 
These two ambiguities raise the question of whether electronic search should be interpreted 
as a special type of judicial search or as an entirely distinct procedure. If it is regarded as a 
special type, then the general provisions on judicial search, including the provision on 
probable cause, will be applicable to the electronic search as well. But if it is interpreted as 
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a distinct procedure, such interpretation will constitute a major differentiation, with respect 
to the preconditions, among different search procedures. Briefly, if the existence of proba-
ble cause is not required for electronic search, it will be easier for the law enforcement of-
ficers to apply this procedure. In other words, law enforcement officers may resort to elec-
tronic search more often even when it is quite obvious that no evidence may be collected 
from the electronic devices. Thereby, conducting unnecessary electronic search would lead 
to an increase in the possibility of privacy violations.  
 
Similar criticisms were presented on the subject, such as the regulations on electronic 
search do not provide for a degree of belief, which may be interpreted as if the existence of 
a simple suspicion that a crime is committed is sufficient to conduct an electronic search
89
. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the electronic search and the interception of communications 
constitute equivalent threat against the privacy; where strong grounds of suspicion is re-
quired for the application of interception of communications and simple suspicion of crime 
is regarded sufficient for the electronic search. Thereby, the respective alteration on the 
degree of suspicion is inconvenient as for the applications of two equally intrusive 
measures
90
.    
 
Article 19 of the Cybercrime Convention on search and seizure of stored computer data 
does not explicitly refer to probable cause either, though in paragraph 186 of the Explana-
tory Report it is stated that; 
 
“With respect to the search for evidence, in particular computer data, in the new 
technological environment, many of the characteristics of a traditional search re-
main…. The preconditions for obtaining legal authority to undertake a search re-
main the same. The degree of belief required for obtaining legal authorization to 
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search is not any different whether the data is in tangible form or in electronic 
form.” 
 
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which applies to electronic 
search as well as traditional search, states that; 
  
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized". 
 
That is to say, same degree of belief is required for traditional search and electronic search 
both in the Fourth Amendment and in the Cybercrime Convention. In theory, the possibility 
of facing privacy violations, by virtue of the degree of belief, are equal in both types of 
search. Thereby, it seems that the implementations in the Fourth Amendment and in the 
Cybercrime Convention are more adequate in comparison with the Turkish legislation on 
this particular subject.  
 
Another inconsistency, arising from the regulatory divergence and increasing the possibil-
ity of privacy violations, is that Article 134(1) of the TCPC allows for search on computers, 
computer programs and logs; whereas Article 17(2) of the Regulation on Judicial and Pre-
ventive Search extends the application of search to computer networks, logs on remote 
computers and other removable electronic devices; such as USB or external hard drive. In 
the hierarchy of laws, statutes are superior to regulations, meaning that a norm in a regula-
tion cannot be contrary to the norm in a statute which forms the legal basis for that very 
norm in the regulation
91
. Also the provision in the regulation cannot broaden the scope of 
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the provision
92
 in the statute which is exactly the case with article 134 of the TCPC and 
article 17 of the Regulation on Judicial and Preventive Search. For instance, assuming that 
upon a decision complying with the requirements in Article 134 of the TCPC and Article 
17(2) of the Regulation on Judicial and Preventive Search, a search is conducted on a sus-
pect’s computer networks, logs on remote computers or other removable electronic devic-
es
93
. The suspect or his attorney can claim that such search is illicit and the legal basis of 
the search is in contrast with the general principles of law on the grounds that Article 17 of 
the Regulation broadens the scope of Article 134 of the TCPC. In this context, the search 
will be considered illegal; thereby, it is also a violation of suspect’s right to privacy.    
 
Lastly, none of the provisions on electronic search provide for an obligation to delete or to 
destroy the electronic data that have been copied during the search. Obligation to delete or 
to destroy the collected data is prominent in three situations: a) the data may proved to be 
irrelevant to the criminal charge, b) at the end of the investigation it may be concluded that 
there is no evidence with sufficient gravity to justify the suspicion which is required to 
open a public claim, or there is no legal possibility of prosecution
94
 c) the judgment may be 
an acquittal
95
. The necessity to impose an obligation to delete was stressed in the Turkish 
doctrine
96
, by stating that the absence of such safeguard, especially in terms of the deletion 
of data relevant to an individual whose innocence has been proved, do not accord with the 
principle of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms
97
. 
 
ii) Problems that occur during the application 
1) Extension of the Scope of Search: Applying the rationale used for analyzing privacy 
concerns in relation to traditional search to the electronic search might be a useful 
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way to apprehend and evaluate the problems that occur during the application of 
electronic search. For these reasons, let’s suppose that there has been a murder. In 
accordance with forensics report and witness statements, the victim was shot with a 
gun and the suspect had escaped from the crime scene with a red pickup truck, but 
the murder weapon was not discovered from the crime scene. After the identifica-
tion of the suspect, police wanted to conduct search on suspect’s house and car. 
Purpose of the search would be discovering the gun used in the crime and other evi-
dence relating to the crime; for instance, plans, photographs or writings indicating 
that the crime is premeditated. In such scenario, the police have to get a search war-
rant in accordance with the Article 119 of the TCPC
98
 and Article 7 of the Regula-
tion on Judicial and Preventive Search
99
. 
In order to conduct a legal search it is crucial that there is probable cause that the 
evidence may be obtained from the place where the search will be conducted
100
. 
Additionally, the following points must be specified in the search warrant: 
 The act which is the ground for the search, 
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 The person with respect to whom the search shall be conducted, the address of the 
residence or other premises to be searched, or the material that is to be searched, 
 The time period in which the warrant is valid101. 
 
In the given example the act of murder is the ground for the search, there is an iden-
tified suspect and the suspect’s house and car are the places where the search will be 
exercised. Concordantly, if the validity period of the search, together with the above 
mentioned information, is written in the warrant, the search will be formally legal. 
 
So what would it be like if the same rationale is applied to an electronic search? 
Let’s take child pornography as an example. A person is suspected of possessing 
child pornography material and in line with the previous explanations
102
 assuming 
that there is probable cause to conduct an electronic search, some questions come to 
mind: what should be the scope of the search and how should it be determined?  
 
In the murder example, murder weapon is the main evidence that is searched by the 
police, suspect’s house and car are the places to search, meaning that the scope of 
that search is pretty much precise. On the other hand, it is not that simple to be pre-
cise when it comes to electronic search.  
 
Suspect’s computer is naturally the main source of evidence, but they can be found 
anywhere within the computer system and even in the networks, logs on remote 
computers and other removable electronic devices; therefore investigators come 
across with a great amount of electronic data.  
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Geographical scope of a search (warrant) and volume of the data subject to search 
are the problems faced by the law enforcement
103
. For the very reason, investigators 
always have to keep in mind what is being searched for which is in the given exam-
ple the child pornography material. Any data irrelevant to child pornography, such 
as files relating to suspect’s work, should not be searched that, otherwise, may con-
stitute a violation of privacy.  
 
“Different cybercrimes [all kinds of crimes] result in different types of digital evi-
dence. For example, cyberstalkers often use e-mail to harass their victims, computer 
crackers sometimes inadvertently leave evidence of their activities in log files, and 
child pornographers have digitized images stored on their computers. Additionally, 
operating systems and computer programs store digital evidence in a variety of 
places. Therefore, the ability to recognize digital evidence depends on an investiga-
tor’s familiarity with the type of crime that was committed and the operating sys-
tem(s) and computer program(s) that are involved”104. Thereby, in order not to in-
terfere with the right to privacy, investigators carrying out the search shall be famil-
iar with the types of electronic evidence, such as .doc (text), .jpg (image) and .wmv 
(video) files, and the operating system(s) and computer program(s). 
 
Issues related to the scope of electronic search were discussed in the Bradley v. 
State of Delaware Case (2012). Briefly, in the case, based on several patient com-
plaints of sexual misconduct against former pediatrician Bradley and the infor-
mation provided from different sources, the police applied a search in Bradley’s 
business premises to obtain electronic evidence indicating the alleged sexual mis-
conduct. Various electronic devices and files were discovered, not just related to the 
sexual misconduct allegations but to child pornography as well. At the appeal, 
Bradley claimed that “the warrant itself was defective because the affidavit in sup-
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port of the search warrant application did not allege facts establishing probable 
cause that the patients’ medical files would be found in a white outbuilding on the 
BayBees Pediatrics property, would be contained in digital format, or would relate 
to the crimes described in the search warrant application. Bradley also contends that 
the police exceeded the scope of the search warrant by proceeding with a general 
search to locate and seize evidence without probable cause”. However, the Court 
concluded that Bradley’s claims lack merit on the grounds that “the affidavit of 
probable cause alleged sufficient facts to support the search warrant …, the actions 
of the police officers in executing the search warrant were reasonable and within the 
bounds of the warrant issued”.  
 
Arguments and explanations asserted in the Court decision are very much useful to 
comprehend and determine boundaries of a legal electronic search that will have di-
rect impact on cases in which the right to privacy is claimed to be infringed on the 
grounds of unreasonable or illegal search. 
 
Another consequence of not setting precise boundaries to the scope of a search may 
be the privacy violation claims from third parties; for instance, during a search on a 
suspect’s private computer, work related documents may be found by the investiga-
tors or a search can be conducted on suspect’s office computer, which is supposed 
to be used for work only, but that is not often the real situation. In such cases, it is 
not just the suspect’s right to privacy what is endangered, it is the employers’, other 
employees’, clients’… etc. rights to privacy that are also put at stake with the appli-
cation of the search. Similarly, a computer may be used by multiple users, therefore 
when a search is carried out on that common computer, other users’ may claim pri-
vacy violations, if the scope of the search is not carefully and precisely set
105
.          
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2) Coincidental Evidence Collected at Electronic Search: “Digital investigators are 
generally authorized to collect and examine only what is directly pertinent to the in-
vestigation”106, in other words the main focus of the search shall be the crime under 
investigation and evidence relating to that crime. However, according to Article 
138(1) of the TCPC; “If a search or seizure reveals an evidence that is not connect-
ed to the current investigation or prosecution, but there are reasonable grounds of 
suspicion that another criminal offense was committed, those items shall be imme-
diately secured and the public prosecutor shall be informed thereof”. This possibil-
ity provided by Article 138(1) may be used to conduct general, exploratory 
search
107
 which may result in breach of right to privacy. 
As noted above in the Turkish legislation, in terms of electronic search, there is not 
a requirement, like having grounds to believe that evidence may be obtained by the 
conduct of an electronic search. Absence of such ground may constitute a threat 
against right to privacy with respect to coincidental evidence, together with the rea-
sons presented in the above chapters. Since, without the obligation to fulfill such 
requirement, the investigators may search the unnecessary and/or irrelevant parts of 
a computer system, just to gather coincidental evidence indicating or revealing oth-
er crimes. In that case, the main purpose of the search is not collecting electronic 
evidence relating to the crime that is being investigated, but instead gathering as 
much evidence as possible against the suspect indicating that he committed other 
crimes.  
In the Turkish doctrine, it is suggested that due to the ease in gathering coincidental 
evidence and the risk of facing with the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, the 
electronic search and seizure shall be limited to certain serious crimes, similar with 
                                                 
 
106
 Casey, E., Digital Evidence and Computer Crime (2011), p.235 
107
 For further explanations on general search see; Galloway, Jr. R. W., The Uninvited Ear: The Fourth 
Amendment Ban On Electronic General Searches (1982) 
 36 
the regulations on interception of communication, which may be a better safeguard 
for the right to privacy
108
.   
 
In the US legal system coincidental evidence does not exist as a concept. The cases, 
in which evidence indicating other crimes is to be found in course of a search, are 
dealt according to a doctrine, developed in the Coolidge v. New Hampshire Case 
(1971), called the ‘plain view’.  
 
“An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the situation in 
which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in 
the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating charac-
ter”109. In other words, “...under certain circumstances the police may seize evi-
dence in plain view without a warrant”110. However; “the plain view doctrine may 
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until 
something incriminating at last emerges”111. “The extension of the original justifica-
tion is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have 
evidence before them”112. In the United States v. Carey (1998) and the United States 
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (2009) cases, the plain view doctrine is dis-
cussed in detail with respect to electronic searches.  
 
In the United States v. Carey (1998)
113
, “…the investigator found child pornogra-
phy on a machine while searching for evidence of drug-related activity but the im-
ages were inadmissible because they were outside of the scope of the warrant”114.  
Based on the characteristics of the case, the Court decided that the investigator had 
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exceeded the scope of the warrant, stating that “seizure of the evidence upon, which 
the charge of conviction was based, was a consequence of an unconstitutional gen-
eral search, and the district court erred by refusing to suppress it”115. However, it is 
also stated that the “results are predicated only upon the particular facts of this case, 
and a search of computer files based on different facts might produce a different re-
sult”116.  
 
Whereas, in the United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (2009), which 
raised many questions about procedures to be followed in electronic search, “…the 
court set out guidelines for electronic searches and seizures so that the ‘plain view’ 
doctrine did not allow electronic fishing expeditions. The guidelines followed an 
approach that is routinely used for electronic surveillance. However, on rehearing 
the case following objections from government prosecutors, the court's new opinion 
removed the guidelines though it still concluded that the search at issue was imper-
missible”117. Judge Bea, who had partially agreed and partially disagreed with the 
decision, stated that: “A valid ‘plain view’ seizure of items that are truly ‘immedi-
ately apparent’ would have required the agent to display only the testing results for 
the ballplayers for whom he had a warrant, and seize only evidence of additional il-
legality if such evidence is ‘immediately apparent’ as part of the segregated results 
for those ballplayers”118. This case is of great importance; because the “…Court 
recommended stricter controls for forensic analysis of digital evidence, challenging 
the concept of plain view in the digital dimension and suggesting approaches to re-
duce the risk of associated privacy violations”119.  
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3) Seizure of electronic evidence: In accordance with the Article 134 of TCPC, law en-
forcement officers can seize the copies of computer records, computers and equip-
ment in course of an electronic search. Copies of the computer records can be 
seized if it is permitted in the decision given by the judge
120
. In the second para-
graph of the same provision, it is stated that computers and equipment can be seized 
if it is deemed to be necessary for the retrieval and copying of information which 
are inaccessible- as the passwords are undecipherable- or unreachable- as they are 
hidden. However, operating systems, user names and passwords are not necessary 
for analyzing computers as a part of digital forensics. Therefore, in reality, seizure 
applies not because the passwords are undecipherable, but because the search and 
analysis of the evidence takes a long time. The provision shall be amended corre-
sponding to the characteristics of digital forensics.   
 
4) Amount of the seized electronic data: “Electronic surveillance presents additional 
problems. It is a sweeping form of investigatory power. It extends beyond a search, 
for it records behavior, social interaction, and everything that a person says and 
does. Rather than a targeted query for information, surveillance is often akin to cast-
ing a giant net, which can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond that which 
was originally sought”121.  
 
The amount of information collected as evidence and seized in the course of an 
electronic search was in fact at issue in a recent case
122
 in Norway. In the case 
brought before the Norwegian High Court, there were two suspects and the police 
conducted a search on one of the suspects’ computer. The hard disk and the other 
‘physical storage media’ were seized by the police and a mirror image of the docu-
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ments was made, and then the devices were returned to the suspect. However 16 
million computer files, in total, were obtained, so that an automatic search by using 
key words, file extensions and location had to be run on all the files and only the 
relevant files are included in the case documents/records.  
According to Section 264 of the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act, “…the prose-
cuting authority shall send a copy of the indictment and the summary of the evi-
dence to defense counsel together with the documents relating to the case”. In the 
case, both of the defendants requested the copies of the all 16 million documents 
obtained from the search due to the principles of equality of arms and the right to 
contradiction, as provided for by the right to get a copy of the case documents in 
Section 264.  
 
However their requests were denied. The reasons of denial were different for each 
defendant. For the defendant whose computer was searched the reason of the denial 
was that his computer had been returned thereby he already had the source of data 
and there was no need to copy 16 million documents. Whereas for the other defend-
ant, the Court said that he can be provided with the copies of the documents which 
had been picked out by the automatic search, but his request had to be denied for the 
rest of the documents on the grounds that the grant of access to the irrelevant docu-
ments may amount to the violation of the privacy of third parties who had interac-
tion with the defendant, whose computer was searched, through his computer. But 
the case also shows that the obtainment of a large quantity of data does not neces-
sarily mean that the police have a great quantity of information. If the police had 
looked through all the data, then all the files had to be copied and included as part 
of the case documents. 
The huge storage capacity of the electronic devices bring along the difficulty of 
dealing with a great amount of information which have to be carefully evaluated in 
the course of an electronic search and seizure. Clearly, relevance is a significant is-
 40 
sue that sets the boundaries for the protection of the right to privacy of the suspects 
and the third parties. 
 
3.1.2 Interception of Communications 
 
According to Article 22(1) of the TC, “everyone has the right to freedom of communica-
tion”. Although, “secrecy of communication is fundamental”123, on “the grounds of nation-
al security, public order, prevention of crime commitment, protection of public health and 
public morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others”124, the right to freedom of 
communication can be restricted with a duly given judge decision. Otherwise, communica-
tion shall not be impeded and its secrecy shall not be violated
125
.   
 
Communication can be intercepted if one or more of the aforementioned reasons exist. The 
interception can be judicial or pre-emptive. If the communication is intercepted in the 
course of criminal investigation for the collection of evidence, then it is called judicial in-
terception which finds its legal basis in the TCPC. Whereas; when the interception takes 
place for intelligence purposes or to prevent certain serious crimes that have the potential to 
endanger the constitutional order and public security, it is called interception for intelli-
gence purposes, pre-emptive interception or administrative interception
126
. The European 
Commission emphasizes the importance of establishing sound legal framework on the in-
terception of telecommunications, by stating that “a clear distinction between judicial inter-
ception and interception for intelligence purposes needs to be made, in line with European 
best practices. Appropriate control mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that these 
tools are not misused”127.  
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Although pre-emptive interception is not a mere criminal procedure and this study focuses 
on criminal investigation procedures, the application of pre-emptive interception, in ac-
cordance with the existing regulation, constitutes a great threat against the right to freedom 
of communication and the right to privacy, therefore it is noteworthy to, briefly, take a look 
at it.  
 
The pre-emptive interception of communication was put into effect with the Law No.5397 
amending Law No. 2559 on ‘Police Duty and Authority’, Law No. 2803 on ‘Military Po-
lice Organization, Duty and Authority’ and Law No. 2937 on ‘Government Intelligence 
Services and National Intelligence Organization’. With the Law No.5397, the police, mili-
tary police and National Intelligence Organization are authorized to intercept communica-
tion
128
. Within the scope of the interception, these organizations are allowed to locate, lis-
ten and/or record communications and/or evaluate the information on signals, but they are 
not allowed to locate mobile phones as the aim in the pre-emptive interception is not catch-
ing a suspect(s). The measure is applicable for all types and means of communication; 
however there is not a limitation on to whom it may be applicable, in other words it can be 
applicable to anyone who is likely to commit a crime. Additionally, the regulation on pre-
emptive interception does not provide for any degree of suspicion. The pre-emptive inter-
ception is applicable any time and does not have to be applied as a last resort, meaning that 
even if it is possible to prevent the occurrence of a crime by other means, this measure may 
be taken
129
. Furthermore, there is no safeguard providing that the person, whose communi-
cation was intercepted, shall be informed at any point either during the exercise of the 
measure or afterwards
130
.    
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Going back to the judicial interception, the main principles for this type of interception are 
regulated under Article 135 of the TCPC
131
. Enforcement of the decisions rendered in ac-
cordance with Article 135 and destroying of the contents of the communication are regulat-
ed in Article 137 of the same Code. Besides, in 2005, ‘Regulation on the Principles and 
Procedures Relating to the Locating, Listening and Recording of Correspondence through 
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the correspondence through telecommunication or to evaluate the information about the signals of the suspect 
or the accused, if during an investigation or prosecution conducted in relation to a crime there are strong 
grounds of suspicion indicating that the crime has been committed and there is no other possibility to obtain 
evidence. The public prosecutor shall submit his decision immediately to the judge for his approval and the 
judge shall make a decision within 24 hours. In cases where the duration expires or the judge decides the 
opposite way, the measure shall be lifted by the public prosecutor immediately. 
(2) The correspondence of the suspect or the accused with individuals who enjoy the privilege of refraining 
from testimony as a witness shall not be recorded. In cases where this circumstance has been revealed after 
the recording has been conducted, the conducted recordings shall be destroyed immediately. 
(3) The decision that shall be rendered according to the provisions of subparagraph 1 shall include the nature 
of the charged crime, the identity of the individual, upon whom the measure is going to be applied, the nature 
of the tool of communication, the number of the telephone, or the code that makes it possible to identify the 
connection of the communication, the nature of the measure, its extent and its duration. The decision of the 
measure may be given for maximum duration of 3 months; this duration may be extended one more time. 
However, for crimes committed within the activities of a crime organization, the judge may decide to extend 
the duration several times, each time for no longer than one month, if deemed necessary. 
(4) The location of the mobile phone may be established upon the decision of the judge, or in cases of peril in 
delay, by the decision of the public prosecutor, in order to be able to apprehend the suspect or the accused. 
The decision related to this matter shall include the number of the mobile phone and the duration of the inter-
action of locating (the establishment). The interaction of locating shall be conducted for maximum of three 
months; this duration may be extended one more time. 
(5) Decisions rendered and interactions conducted according to the provisions of this article shall be kept 
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(6) The provisions contained in this article related to listening, recording and evaluating the information about 
the signals shall only be applicable for the crimes as listed below: 
a) The following crimes in the Turkish Criminal Code; 1. Smuggling with migrants and human trafficking 
(Arts. 79, 80), 2. Killing with intent (Arts. 81, 82, 83), 3. Torture (Arts. 94, 95), 4. Sexual assault (Art. 102, 
except for subsection 1), 5. Sexual abuse of children (Art. 103), 6. Producing and trading with narcotic or 
stimulating substances (Art. 188), 7. Forgery in money (Art. 197), 8. Forming an organization in order to 
commit crimes (Art. 220, except for subsections 2, 7 and 8), 9. Prostitution (Art. 227, subparagraph 3), 10. 
Cheating in bidding (Art. 235), 11. Bribery (Art. 252), 12. Laundering of assets emanating from crime (Art. 
282), 13. Armed criminal organization (Art. 314) or supplying such organizations with weapons (Art. 315), 
14. Crimes against the secrets of the state and spying (Arts. 328, 329, 330, 331, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337). 
b) Smuggling with guns, as defined in Act on Guns and Knives and other Tools (Art. 12), 
c) The crime of embezzlement as defined in Act on Banks, Art. 22, subparagraphs (3) and (4), 
d) Crimes as defined in Combating Smuggling Act, which carry imprisonment as punishment, 
e) Crimes as defined in Act on Protection of Cultural and Natural Substances, Arts. 68 and 74. 
(7) No one may listen and record the communication through telecommunication of another person except 
under the principles and procedures as determined in this Article.” 
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Telecommunications and Evaluation of Information on Signals and the Establishment, Du-
ties and Authority of the Telecommunications Directorate’ (Regulation No. 25989) and in 
2007, ‘Regulation on the Application of Interception of Correspondence Through Tele-
communications, Undercover Investigator and Surveillance with Technical Means Provid-
ed in the Code of Criminal Procedure’ (Regulation No. 26434) were put into force.  
 
Aim of the Regulation No. 25989 is to provide more detailed regulation on the procedures 
and principles related to- both judicial and pre-emptive- interception of communication
132
; 
however, apart from the provision on definitions
133
 and the regulation related to the estab-
lishment, duties and authorities of the Telecommunication Directorate
134
, it is hardly possi-
ble to say that the Regulation introduces further regulation on interception. Whereas, Arti-
cle 1 of the Regulation No. 26434 states the aim of the Regulation as; to set principles and 
procedures that are applicable to the requests and decisions related to and applications of 
the following measures: interception of communications, undercover investigator and sur-
veillance with technical means, and as a matter of fact, it does bring detailed provisions. 
Nevertheless, there are some inconveniences emerging from the legislation on judicial in-
terception of communication, but it shall be born in mind that all the explanations below 
relate to Article 135 of the TCPC, as it sets the framework, unless another provision is spe-
cifically mentioned.   
 
In the course of interception the following activities may be carried out: locating
135
, listen-
ing and recording of the communications
136
, evaluating the information about the signals
137
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and locating mobile phones. Article 135 of the TCPC provides two important safeguards 
for the protection of the right to privacy and the freedom of communication. Firstly, differ-
ent from the provision on electronic search and seizure, the judicial interception is applica-
ble only if there are strong grounds of suspicion indicating that the crime has been commit-
ted. And secondly, recording of the correspondence between the suspect or the accused and 
the individuals who enjoy the privilege of refraining from testimony as a witness
138
 is pro-
hibited.  This prohibition could constitute a remarkable safeguard for the protection of the 
right to privacy as the people listed under Article 45 of the TCPC are immediate family, but 
if the prohibition had included the locating and the listening of the communications
139
, to-
gether with the recording of communications. In this sense, existing wording of the provi-
sion is open to exploitations
140
.   
The interception of communication is applicable only if there is no other possibility to ob-
tain evidence which is interpreted as ‘last resort’ in the Turkish doctrine; in practice, how-
ever, it may cause abusive applications.  
According to Article 4(c) of the Regulation No. 26434, just the expectation of not being 
able to obtain evidence by other means is sufficient for fulfilling the requirement of not 
having any other possibility to obtain evidence. That is to say, if it is expected that the in-
vestigation will not be successful by the exercise of so called ‘classical measures’, such as 
arrest, interview or seizure, or the effort made to get successful results from the classical 
measures is burdensome, then it is considered that there is no other possibility of gathering 
evidence
141
. In such case, the investigators do not have to, firstly, apply other measures and 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
137
 Article 3(p) of the Regulation No. 25989 and article 4(h) of the Regulation No. 26434- ‘Information on 
signals’: All kinds of data processed for the transmission of communication within a network and for billing 
purposes. and article 4(ı) of the Regulation No. 26434- ‘Evaluation of the information on signals’: Activities 
carried out, within the scope of the decision given by the authorities, to trace and give meaning to the signals 
left in communication networks without interfering with the communication.    
138
 Article 45 of the TCPC 
139
 Yavuz, H.A., Ceza Yargılamasında Bir Koruma Tedbiri Olarak Telekomünikasyon Yoluyla Yapılan 
İletişimin Denetlenmesi (2005), p.249  
140
 ibid 
141
 Kunter, N. and Yenisey, F., Muhakeme Hukuku Dalı Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku (2002), p. 640. 
 45 
then prove that they could not get any result by such conduct. It is possible to directly apply 
interception of communication
142, not as a ‘last resort’. Thereby, the application of this 
requirement is rather subjective and subject to arbitrariness and exploitation which, in this 
way, could not serve as an objective and adequate safeguard for the protection of the right 
to privacy. 
Although the interception of communication is a measure that is applicable for the collec-
tion of evidence, which is essentially an investigative activity, it is possible to apply this 
measure also during the prosecution. Prosecution is “the phase beginning with the decision 
on the admissibility of the indictment and ending with the final judgment”143. According to 
Article 170 (2) of the TCPC, “in cases where, at the end of the investigation phase, collect-
ed evidence constitute sufficient suspicion that a crime has been committed, then the public 
prosecutor shall prepare an indictment” which shall contain, along with some other 
points
144, the “evidence of the offense”145. If the prosecution has begun, this would mean 
that the collected evidence is sufficient to give a judgment
146
. In that case, applying or con-
ducting new measures should not be a necessity anymore, but if it is still necessary to apply 
coercive measures to reveal the facts then it should not be proceeded to the prosecution
147
. 
In this respect, it is correct to say that the interception applied during the prosecution does 
not merely pursue the aim of fact-finding. In other words, the aim of the prosecution is to 
decide, based on the existing evidence, whether the accused committed the alleged 
crime(s), whereas the aim of the coercive measures is fact-finding which is specific to the 
investigation phase. Therefore, the application of such an intrusive measure during the 
prosecution is not proportionate with the targeted aim of the measure itself. According to 
Article 13 of the TC, the restriction shall not be contrary to the principle of proportionality 
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which, otherwise, would constitute a violation of the right in question. Disproportionate 
application of interception would amount to violation of right to privacy and freedom of 
communication.   
Another inconvenience, resulting from the way that Article 135 of the TCPC has been 
regulated, is related to the extension of the duration of the interception decision. If the in-
terception decision is given in order to collect evidence relating to the crimes committed 
within the activities of a criminal organization, the duration of the interception decision 
may be extended several times, if deemed necessary
148
. However neither of the regulations 
state when or under what conditions extension is deemed to be necessary, and also there is 
not a limitation on how many times the decision of interception can be extended. So in such 
case one may consider that extension is necessary until some evidence is obtained. But is it 
convenient to extend the decision and continue to apply interception forever? The answer 
shall be no to that question, because such an application would be excessive and arbitrary, 
and it would possibly result in violations of right to privacy and freedom of communica-
tion
149
.   
 
In Klass and Others v. Germany Case (1978), the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) established significant principles that shall be followed both during the enactment 
and the application of surveillance measures, namely interception of communications. In its 
judgment, the Court accepted that surveillance provided for under the national legislations 
“…amount to an interference [by the public authorities] with the exercise of the right set 
forth in Article 8 para.1” of the ECHR. Thereby, “the cardinal issue arising under Article 
8”150 was addressed as “whether the interference so found is justified by the terms of para-
graph 2 of the Article”151. Since the second paragraph of the article provides an exception 
to the right to privacy, the Court laid emphasis on the narrow interpretation of the excep-
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tion by stating that the “powers of secret surveillance of citizens … are tolerable under the 
Convention [ECHR] only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic 
institutions”152. “In order for the ‘interference’ … not to infringe Article 8 (art. 8), it must, 
according to paragraph 2 (art. 8-2), first of all have been ‘in accordance with the law’”153; 
however it still remains to be determined whether the other requisites laid down in para-
graph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2) are also satisfied. That is to say, in each case it shall be de-
termined whether the application of interception of communication is necessary in a demo-
cratic society for one of the purposes enumerated in the paragraph. Although the Court 
leaves to the domestic legislature a certain degree of discretion on determining the surveil-
lance systems and policies, it also stresses that “whatever system of surveillance is adopted, 
there [has to] exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse”154. The assessment of 
whether there exists adequate and effective guaranties shall be done on a case-by-case basis 
“as [to] the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for 
ordering such measures, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise such 
measures, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law”155. 
Furthermore, in Malone v. the United Kingdom Case (1984), the ECtHR reinforced its ap-
proach about the interception of communications and developed the following interpreta-
tion on the phrase ‘in accordance with the law’: 
“The Court would reiterate its opinion that the phrase ‘in accordance with the law’ 
does not merely refer back to domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, 
requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in 
the preamble to the Convention [ECHR] … The phrase thus implies - and this fol-
lows from the object and purpose of Article 8 (art. 8) - that there must be a measure 
of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authori-
ties with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1 (art. 8-1)…” 
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These approaches have been pursued by the ECtHR in the later cases
156
, in which, it is in-
ferred that “…tapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations constitute 
a serious interference with private life and correspondence and must accordingly be based 
on a ‘law’ that is particularly precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the sub-
ject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisti-
cated”157. 
3.2 Under Cybercrime Convention 
 
3.2.1 Criticisms against the Convention  
 
The Convention, especially during its drafting process, faced much criticism from privacy 
groups and civil liberties organizations, most of which are established in the US. In 2005, 
Marc Rotenberg- at the time the EPIC
158
 President- and Cédric Laurant- at the time the 
EPIC Director, International Privacy Project, Policy Counsel- released the ‘EPIC Statement 
on COE Cybercrime Convention, Treaty 108-11’ and put forth the following criticisms 
against the Convention; 
 
 The Convention Lacks Adequate Safeguards for Privacy: “The treaty would create 
invasive investigative techniques while failing to provide meaningful privacy and 
civil liberties safeguards, and specifically lacking judicial review and probable 
cause determinations required under the Fourth Amendment. A significant number 
of provisions grant sweeping investigative powers of computer search and seizure 
and government surveillance of voice, e-mail, and data communications in the in-
terests of law enforcement agencies, but are not counterbalanced by accompanying 
protections of individual rights or limit on governments' use of these powers”. 
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 Vague and Weak Privacy Protections: “This provision [Article 15 of the Cyber-
crime Convention] is quite vague, and is not reiterated with specific and detailed 
protections within any of the specific provisions. For example, provisions on expe-
dited preservation of stored computer data and expedited preservation and partial 
disclosure of traffic data make no mention of limitations on the use of these tech-
niques with an eye to protection of privacy and human rights. Furthermore, the 
vagueness of this provision (and others) introduces the risk of enhancement of the 
flaws and benefits of the Cybercrime Convention overall, as the Convention is 
transposed into the laws of ratifying countries which may have drastically different 
pre-existing privacy and human rights protections”.  
 Insufficient Recognition of International Human Rights Obligations: “Examination 
of the Preamble is extremely illuminating on this point, with eight clauses related to 
the interests of law enforcement, crime-prevention, and national security, and only 
two oriented toward protection of privacy and human rights. Coupled with the lack 
of consideration of, and compliance with, important international conventions on 
human rights, it becomes clear that the Cybercrime Convention is much more like a 
law enforcement ‘wish list’ than an international instrument truly respectful of hu-
man rights”. 
 
The abovementioned criticisms are justifiable for the states which are party to the Cyber-
crime Convention but not to the ECHR, such as Canada, Japan, South Africa and USA; 
because although Article 15 of the Cybercrime Convention requires the parties to respect 
human rights and freedoms, the rights and safeguards afforded by the states, which are not 
party to the ECHR, may not be adequate to the rights and protection measures afforded by 
the parties to the ECHR. In other words, Article 15 does not provide for a harmonized pro-
tection system equally applicable in all the signatory states
159
.  
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Most of the criticisms against the Convention center upon the new powers acknowledged to 
law enforcement to conduct investigations and surveillance. It is strongly argued that the 
procedural rules undermine individual privacy rights and expand surveillance powers too 
far
160
. Moreover, it is also stated that the Convention does not place explicit limits on the 
powers and does not create mechanisms to ensure that the powers are not being misused
161
. 
David Banisar, who is a lawyer and consultant in the Washington, DC area, and Gus 
Hosein, who is a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics, name this model cre-
ated by the Convention as the ‘High-Investigative-Powers/ Low-Rights-Protections’162. 
 
3.2.2 Proposed Recommendations 
 
David Banisar and Gus Hosein recommend that the model of ‘High-Investigative-Powers/ 
Low-Rights-Protections’ shall be reversed to a model “where High-Investigative-Powers 
can be sought because High-Rights-Protections are already assured”163. If this cannot be 
achieved, then at least “a model that grants a base-case, basic necessities in cybercrime 
legislation, and then lets signatory states, at their own discretion without international pres-
sure through the ambiguous formulation of the requirements of this convention, manage 
and interpret what is required for their national interests”164 shall be adopted. They call it 
‘Adequate-Investigative-Powers/ Adequate-Rights-Protections’ model. By virtue of such 
model, individuals’ rights are expected to uphold the highest form of protection165.  
 
As it is suggested by the authors, an example of adequate protection may be, “when the 
CoE [Cybercrime Convention] mentions 'empowering' competent authorities for investiga-
tion…, [it] must [be] ensure[d] at the early stages that the clause is included: ‘with signifi-
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cant controls, i.e. judicial warrants, and under probable cause based on evidence acquired 
elsewhere.’ This is a philosophical point, but must be mentioned early on, and not as some 
add-on. Otherwise this convention is all about granting powers to law enforcement agen-
cies, and dismisses the CoE's [Cybercrime Convention’s] own claim to be respectful of 
human rights. In creating a legislative infrastructure for searching, surveillance, and sei-
zure, to not discuss the constraints on such a system denies all that we have learned about 
political systems. To leave it up to national discretion basically mandates increasing pow-
ers, while not raising the levels of protection of individuals”166.  
 
Similarly, the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC) has also proposed some recom-
mendations in the ‘Member Letter’ that they had published in 2000, even before the Con-
vention was opened for signature. In spite of the fact that the Convention underwent tre-
mendous amendments, some issues raised back then still keeps their actuality and validity. 
The recommendations which may as well stand today are as follows: 
 the use of invasive powers must be applied only to serious crimes,  
 the concept of ‘proportionality’ must be defined at the international level, and 
agreed uniformly and unilaterally, 
 a consistent regime of civil liberties protections must be added, 
 clear limits shall be set to the powers involving situations where civil liberties are 
compromised,  
 a clear definition of 'content data' shall be provided with and it shall be clearly dif-
ferentiated from the 'traffic data', 
 the powers of interception and data gathering devices shall be limited so as to abso-
lutely limit the invasiveness- “…if technical means are used, these means must sep-
arate out the traffic of the specific user under investigation, gather only the legally 
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permitted amount of data, disallow tampering, and respect the shifting division be-
tween content and traffic data…”167, 
 the difference between retention and preservation of data requires explicit protec-
tions. 
The GILC also stated that the traffic data collection is as invasive as the interception of 
content data; therefore, it urges sufficient uniform constraints prior to the collection. 
With respect to investigative powers, it is argued that “…the Convention must also es-
tablish a maximum threshold of investigative techniques that are acceptable; 
unjudicious access and data warehousing are gross invasions of civil liberties”168. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
Electronic evidence is any probative information stored or transmitted in digital form and is 
different from traditional evidence in following aspects: may change within a computer 
and/or transmission line at any moment, may be easily altered without leaving any trace, is 
easily changeable/distortable during its collection, may not be perceived at first sight, needs 
to be transformed to a humanly readable form, may be obtained to the amount it is recorded 
and much effected by the velocity of technology.  
Turkish law neither mentions electronic evidence nor provides a categorization based on 
the types of electronic evidence as in the Cybercrime Convention. Despite the deficiencies, 
such as the absence of definition of ‘content data’, structure in the Convention is clearer 
and more appropriate, thereby adoption of a similar categorization system in the Turkish 
law is suggestible. 
Another difference between the Turkish law and the Cybercrime Convention relates to the 
procedures on collection of electronic evidence. Turkish law provides for ‘search of com-
puters, computer programs and transcripts, copying and provisional seizure’, ‘locating, 
listening and recording of correspondence’ and ‘surveillance with technical means’. 
Whereas, the Convention provides for ‘expedited preservation of stored computer data’, 
‘expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data’, ‘production order’, ‘search 
and seizure of stored computer data’, ‘real-time collection of traffic data’ and ‘interception 
of content data’. 
Nevertheless, there is one mutual problem of these two instruments: privacy concerns relat-
ing to the collection of electronic evidence. Article 8 of the ECHR and Articles 20 and 22 
of the TC regulate the ‘right to privacy and respect for correspondence’, and Article 15 of 
the Cybercrime Convention requires respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
However, Article 8(2) of the ECHR and Articles 13, 20(2) and 22(2) of the TC allow for 
restriction of the right to privacy and respect for correspondence. If it is necessary in a 
democratic society and for the prevention of disorder or crime, in compliance with the 
principle of proportionality, the right to privacy may be restricted; however, due to the ex-
isting regulation on the procedures relating to the collection of electronic evidence, there 
are certain treats against privacy.   
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Article 20(2) of the TC does not refer to computers. Thereby, it is ambiguous whether 
computers may be interpreted as included in the provision and whether the provision is 
applicable to electronic search. If it is in affirmative, it will be possible to resort to Article 
20(2) in cases where there is violation of right to privacy in the course of an electronic 
search. However acceptance of the contrary will block the opportunity of affording Consti-
tutional protection to the individuals’ right to privacy in cases where privacy violations 
occur during the application of electronic search.  
Neither Article 134 of the TCPC nor Article 17 of the Regulation on Judicial and Preven-
tive Search set ‘probable cause’ as a precondition of electronic search, meaning that the 
simple suspicion that a crime has been committed is sufficient for the application of such 
an intrusive measure. Therefore, unnecessary electronic search may be conducted by the 
law enforcement which could increase the risk of violating individuals’ privacy. The regu-
lation under the Turkish law has to be amended, harmonizing the grounds of traditional and 
electronic search as in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Cybercrime 
Convention. 
Another issue that has to be amended in Article 134 of the TCPC is that communication 
networks, logs on remote computers and other remote electronic devices have to be includ-
ed in the provision or these have to be excluded from the scope of Article 17 of the Regula-
tion on Judicial and Preventive Search in order to create compliance with the general prin-
ciples of law. 
In none of the legislation, there is an obligation to delete the electronic data that have been 
copied during an electronic search; however, provision of such obligation is extremely im-
portant in terms of according with the principle of protection of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. 
In addition to the legislative problems, the first difficulty in the application of electronic 
search is that the geographical scope of an electronic search is not easy to determine. How-
ever in order to avoid such problem the law enforcement officers may be familiarized with 
the different types of electronic evidence left behind in a computer system and the parts of 
computer systems in which the relevant evidence may be obtained. This would help to set 
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the scope of an electronic search precisely and not to exceed the scope which, otherwise, 
may constitute infringement of the right to privacy. 
Second problem about the application of electronic search is that due to the weak grounds 
set for electronic search, in particular, the absence of ‘probable cause’ precondition, the 
measure may be performed to obtain coincidental evidence which would amount to a gen-
eral search. In order to avoid such electronic fishing expeditions and exploratory search 
giving rise to privacy violations, the discussions and approaches developed in the U.S. 
case-law on the ‘plain view doctrine’ shall be taken into consideration. 
According to Article 134 of the TCPC, it is possible to seize copies of computer records, 
computers and equipment, if the data is inaccessible or unreachable; however, the grounds 
of seizure do not correspond with the characteristics of digital forensics, thereby requires 
amendment. 
In the course of electronic search a great amount of data may be seized and some of the 
data may comprise information related to third parties. By running automatic search with 
keywords, file extension etc. potential privacy violations may be avoided as the law en-
forcement officers would not be looking through all the data gathered. And also it is neces-
sary to include only the data relevant to the case to the case documents.  
As to the interception of communication, there are two types of interception: judicial and 
pre-emptive. The pre-emptive interception is applicable to anyone, at any time, without any 
notification necessary. Due to such broad and lose scope of application, the potential of 
privacy infringements is quite high. 
On the other hand, application of judicial interception is limited only to certain serious 
crimes, and only if there are strong grounds of suspicion. However, these are not enough to 
say that the regulation on judicial interception provides sufficient safeguards for the protec-
tion of fundemental freedoms. First of all, correspondence of the suspect with individuals’ 
who may refrain from testimony cannot be recorded; however it may be listened or located. 
In this sense, it still contains treat against privacy. 
Interception of communication is supposed to be a last resort; however, according to the 
understanding in the Turkish doctrine, the law enforcement officers do not have to make an 
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actual effort to obtain evidence by other means, so the application on the measure remains 
rather subjective and subject to arbitrariness and exploitation.      
Furthermore, the legislation allows for the application of interception during the prosecu-
tion which causes the measure to go beyond its purpose and be disproportionate with its 
original aim. This has to be corrected in order not to contradict with Article 13 of the TC 
and carry out a procedure infringing the right to privacy. 
The regulation on the interception decision given upon the activities of a criminal organiza-
tion does not set a maximum limit for the extension of the decisions and the situations 
where the extension is deemed necessary. Thereby, it is likely that the measure may be 
used excessively and arbitrarily. 
During the enactment and the application of the surveillance measures, the principles de-
termined by the ECtHR in its case-law on the Article 8 of the ECHR shall be taken into 
consideration. 
However, the Cybercrime Convention does not also seem to be solving the problems relat-
ing to privacy, due the fact that it introduces invasive investigation techniques which are 
not counterbalanced with adequate safeguards for privacy or, in other words, the privacy 
protections afforded in the Convention are vague and weak. Moreover, in the Convention 
the recognition of international human rights obligations are insufficient. Based on the pri-
vacy criticisms brought against the Convention several recommendations have been pro-
posed. Among all recommendations the most purposive ones are: setting clear limits to the 
powers involving situations where civil liberties are compromised, applying the use of in-
vasive powers only to serious crimes, defining the concept of ‘proportionality’ at the inter-
national level, agreed uniformly and unilaterally. 
Consequently, the regulations in Turkish law and Cybercrime Convention concerning elec-
tronic evidence and procedures on collection of electronic evidence and their applications 
endanger the right to privacy. For the elimination of privacy concerns both legislation have 
to be improved by ensuring better safeguards and stronger conditions for the protection of 
human rights and fundemental freedoms.     
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